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The Graying of American Debt 
Abstract 
Between 2003 and 2015, real aggregate debt in the hands of Americans aged 50 to 80 increased by 59 
percent. Meanwhile, real debt held by Americans in their twenties and thirties was approximately flat. 
Using data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Consumer Credit Panel, we describe the extent 
of this debt increase and the distribution of debt growth by loan type. Real per capita home-secured debts 
held by older consumers show the steepest growth, though older borrowers have increased their 
obligations in all major debt categories. For long-held debts, these developments lead us to ask how such 
changes emerged: did older borrowers carry more debt through the Great Recession, after which access 
to consumer credit declined for new borrowers of all ages? Alternatively, have loan originations since the 
Great Recession favored older over younger borrowers? While our results indicate that the stock of long-
held, home-secured debt sits largely with older borrowers, we also uncover evidence of a decisive tilt of 
new auto and mortgage originations away from younger borrowers and toward borrowers in their fifties, 
sixties, and even seventies. The motivation behind older consumers’ substantial new borrowing, often 
with long repayment terms, is the focus of ongoing research. 
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As the US population ages, older Americans are reshaping the face of consumer debt. In 
this chapter, we use the New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel (CCP), based on Equifax credit 
report data, to look at how debt is changing as Baby Boomers reach retirement and Millennials 
find their footing. We find that aggregate debt balances held by younger borrowers have essentially 
remained constant from 2003 to 2017, but their portfolio had moved away from mortgage, auto, 
and credit card debt, toward student debt. Debt held by borrowers between the ages of 55 and 80, 
however, increased by 87 percent in real terms over the same time period. This shifting of debt 
from younger to older borrowers is of obvious relevance to markets fueled by consumer credit. It 
is also relevant from a loan performance perspective, as consumer debt payments are being made 
by older debtors than in past decades. 
To understand such marked growth in debt held later in life, one must consider the 
composition of older borrowers’ obligations. In CCP data, we break per capita debt balances for 
consumers under 35 and over 64 years of age into home-secured, auto, education, and card debt. 
While auto and home-secured debt for those under 35 declines substantially from 2003 to 2017, 
education debt increases dramatically. Young consumers’ debt portfolios show a similar overall 
per capita balance in 2003 and 2017, and yet underlying this is a decisive reallocation away from 
debt secured by large assets and into substantial amounts of education debt. Consumers and 65+, 
however, show no similar reallocation of debt. Instead, we observe growth in per capita consumer 
debt from 2003 through 2007, and then a further increase in per capita debt by 2017. This growth 
is evident in the balances of most standard consumer debts for retirement-age individuals, and 
most noteworthy in residential and auto debt. Real per capita residential debt among those 65+ in 
the CCP grew by 89 percent from 2003 to 2017, and real per capita auto debt by 69 percent. Hence, 




have propped up demand in home and auto loan markets. Widely-reported evidence of a gradual 
recovery of these consumer debt markets toward pre-recession levels has masked a combination 
of younger consumers’ waning participation in housing and auto markets and older consumers’ 
increasing reliance on secured debt well into retirement (New York Fed 2017; Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) 2017; Davidson 2017; Berry 2017). 
But what sort of housing consumption rationalizes such a climb in residential debt among 
retirees? For answers, we turn to the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances 
(SCF).1 In determining the uses of debt, survey data are helpful, and the SCF particularly so. We 
again analyze the composition of real per capita debt growth among younger and older Americans 
using the SCF and, despite some well-known dissimilarities between CCP and SCF debt measures, 
by and large, we find similar patterns (Brown et al. 2015). Further, the self-reported purposes of 
residential mortgages in the SCF allow us to separate debt secured by the primary residence from 
other residential debt secured by assets such as second homes, vacation homes, and land contracts. 
This exercise demonstrates that, in real terms, both primary residence debt and other residential 
debt have grown substantially among households whose heads are age 55+. Per capita primary 
residence debt rose by $21,229 from 2001 to 2016 (68%), and per capita other residential debt rose 
by $5,417 (102%). 2 Hence, this combined evidence from the CCP and SCF shows us that most of 
the debt-climb among older households in recent years comes from growth in residential debt, and 
that more than a fifth of this increase arises from properties other than the primary residence. 
Our next query concerns the path by which the economy has arrived at this new 
circumstance, in which consumer debt is at least as much the province of retirement-age 
households as that of young families. A slowdown in all types of lending in the wake of the 




loan, and the age of its associated borrower. At the same time, to the extent that inferred 
creditworthiness correlates with age, tightening underwriting standards may have affected access 
to new debt differently for younger and older borrowers. We begin by establishing evidence from 
the CCP that credit scores increase steeply with age among US consumers. Given this, we turn to 
the age distribution of new originations of mortgages and auto loans in, first the early 2000s, and 
then in 2017 for news regarding the relative contributions of a slowdown in lending and a tilting 
of new originations toward older borrowers to the overall graying of US consumer debt. We find 
evidence of both slowed originations and a tilt of new originations toward older lenders in 
mortgage and auto loan markets, with the mortgage market characterized more accurately by a 
slowdown and the auto loan market characterized more accurately by a reallocation of new auto 
loans away from young borrowers and toward borrowers in their 60s, 70s, and beyond. 
Next, a look at repayment reveals that, despite the growth in debt among seniors, older 
borrowers have long been noteworthy for the reliability of their debt repayment, and there is little 
or no evidence of a change on this front. The rate at which borrowers’ debt transitions into severe 
derogatory status in the CCP slopes downward steeply with age, and this relationship is stable 
from 2003 through 2007 to 2017. A similar pattern emerges in SCF households’ self-reported 60-
days-past-due delinquency. These results hold despite evidence from the SCF that the ratio of self-
reported debt payments to income is no greater for younger than for older borrowers over this 
period, and within each wave. If the large recent increase in debt in the hands of seniors is leading 
to new threats to household financial stability, the evidence of such threats does not emerge in the 
form of rising delinquency and default. If anything, our findings suggest that the reallocation of 
debt from risky younger borrowers to reliable older borrowers over the past 15 years is likely to 




 Finally, though the above analysis paints a somewhat rosy picture of the reasons for, and 
repayment performance of, this new glut of senior debt in the aggregate, there may remain pockets 
of seniors who are now struggling with consumer debt. To determine how more and less affluent 
seniors are weathering new consumer debt, we perform heterogeneity analysis of debt levels, 
growth, and repayment across the distributions of household asset levels and neighborhood income 
levels. In the SCF, we find that growth of debt balances for households in the top two deciles of 
the household asset distribution for those 55+ dwarfs the debt growth for lower-asset older 
households, largely from primary residence and other residential debt. Nevertheless, we do find 
some suggestion of rising in heterogeneity in the ratio of debt to assets for older SCF households. 
Though the dollar increases in debt for affluent older households are striking, increases in the ratio 
of debt to assets are marked only for older households in the lower asset deciles. The rise in the 
ratio of debt to assets is evident for the second through fifth decile, but then remains near zero 
throughout the top half of the asset distribution. The jump in the ratio of debt to assets for the 
lowest asset households is largely attributable to a substantial increase in the ratio of student debt 
to assets. Overall, the increase in debt for the lowest decile of the asset distribution amounts to an 
increase in their total debt to asset ratio from 0.33 to 1.02 between 2001 and 2016. The second 
through fifth deciles of the age 55+ household asset distribution show an increase in the ratio of 
total debt to assets of 0.13, arising mainly from a growth in primary residence debt relative to 
assets. 
 Having established these patterns in the distributional characteristics of borrowing at 
older ages, we compare the news for older households with that for younger households. While 




some signs of increased debt burden among the first decile of the age 55+ household asset 
distribution, signs of struggle with debt are immediately obvious for younger borrowers. 
In what follow, we summarize findings regarding debt growth, originations, uses, 
repayment, and burden among older and younger consumers. Additionally, in an Online 
Appendix3, we discuss recent developments in aggregate borrowing at younger and older ages, 
summarize the related literature, and detail the administrative and survey data on consumer debt 
on which we build this study. 
 
Measurement and Empirical Findings 
Rising per capita US consumer debt from 2003 to 2017 and its components. A large increase 
in debt among retirees may mean different things depending on the type of borrowing they have 
done, and on whether the debt is asset-secured or not. Figure 1 divides the CCP real per capita debt 
of younger and older consumers in 2003, 2007, and 2017 into its component types (all in $2016). 
In panel (a) of Figure 1, we see young borrowers increasing their total debt from 2003 to 2007 by 
$7,280, from $30,876 in 2003 to $38,156 by 2007. By 2017, however, they returned to pre-crisis 
debt levels, with a mean per capita debt of $28,315. Moreover, the composition of their debt 
changed dramatically in comparison with both 2003 and 2007. The lower segments of the bars 
depict the movement of housing debt over the period, and we see that real per capita housing debt 
for the young households increased from $19,465 in 2003 to $25,493 by 2007, but then reversed 
course to fall well below its 2003 levels by 2017, to $14,172. The growth of the segment of the 
bar second to the top shows us the steady expansion of per capita education debt over the period, 
from $3,212 in 2003, through $5,320 in 2007 to $8,080 by 2017. A noteworthy aspect of this chart 




year-olds over the course of 14 years. 
Figure 1 here  
By contrast, older borrowers spent these same 14 years boosting their (real, per capita) 
reliance on housing, card, auto, and education debt. Panel (b) of Figure 1 depicts real per capita 
debt balances by type among individuals age 65+. The lower segments depict a steady rise of 
housing debt, from $14,220 through $22,163 to $26,929. Note that, by 2017, mean per capita 
housing debt among retirement-age Americans exceeded even the peak housing debt observed for 
young consumers in 2007. This overall rise amounted to an 89 percent increase in real per capita 
housing debt from 2003 to 2017. It echoes the rising housing debt across three cohorts of Health 
and Retirement Study respondents demonstrated in Lusardi et al. (2018), the rise in housing debt 
among older CCP fileholders reported by Brown et al. (2016), and the rise in housing debt among 
older Americans reflected in CoreLogic loan-level data in Trawinski (2020). But this is not the 
only source of increasing financial obligation among retirement-age Americans: auto debt grew 
from $1,655 through $1,748 to $2,798 (69%), and card debt increased from $2,669 to $3,114 
(17%). Education debt rose over the period even for retirement-age consumers, from a real per 
capita mean of $69 in 2003 through $191 in 2007 to $727 by 2017. Unlike younger consumers, 
older consumers have become more reliant on all four major categories of consumer debt. 
Though borrowing among older consumers increased across all debt markets, the dollar 
amount of the rise in housing debt stands out, leading to questions regarding the sources of this 
extensive housing debt now being carried far into retirement. Is this debt securing the primary 
residence of the older household, or does it reflect vacation and second homes, which may have 
very different implications for household financial stability in retirement? Is the debt assumed for 




used by children and other relatives? For answers, we turn to the SCF. Figure 2 depicts the 
composition of real per household debt reported by SCF households. Heads of households 
represented in Panel (a) of Figure 2 are age 18 to 34, while heads of households represented in 
Panel (b) are age 55+.4 The long history and stable questionnaire of the SCF allow us to establish 
a pattern of consumer borrowing over a longer window of observation, with measures drawn from 
the 1989, 2001, 2007, and 2016 waves. The qualitative patterns of debt use among younger 
households in the SCF from 2001, through 2007, to 2016 closely resemble the pattern for young 
individuals observed in the CCP in 2003, 2007, and 2017. The extension of the window of 
observation back to 1989 does add one new insight. The drop in reported housing debt secured by 
the primary residence (the lower segment of each bar) from the housing boom peak in 2007 to the 
more recent balance in 2016 actually takes housing debt for households with heads age 34 and 
under in 2016 back to a level very near its real per household level from 1989: mean primary 
residence debt among these young households rose from $35,115 in 1989 through $44,014 in 2001 
and $71,939 in 2007, then fell all the way to $40,261 by 2016.5 
Figures 2 here 
By contrast, debt among older households in the SCF increased sharply from 2001 to 2007 
and then leveled off to 2016. Panel (b) of Figure 2 depicts changes household-level debt by type 
in the SCF that closely resemble the evidence for individual debt in the CCP over this period.6 In 
the lower segments of the debt bars, we see the rise of debt secured by the primary residence from 
$13,071 to a peak of $58,222 by 2007, and then retreat modest to $52,650 in 2016. The SCF allows 
us to follow debt secured by other residences separately, represented by the top segment of each 
debt bar, and its rise is particularly steep. Other residential debt increases from $3,386 in 1989 




a fifth of the increase in overall residential debt among older households between the early 2000s 
and 2016 is seen, in the SCF, to arise from debt collateralized by property other than the primary 
residence. Finally, much like the older CCP consumers, older SCF households increased their auto 
debt from 2001 to 2016 by 69 percent in real terms. Older households in both the CCP and SCF 
boosted the dollar amount of their total debt balances largely through secured borrowing against 
residences and vehicles, and the SCF data show us that an unexpectedly large share of this growth 
arose from debt associated with properties other than the primary residence. 
The path from the early 2000s to today: underwriting changes and origination ages. Next we 
ask how retirement-age Americans accumulated unprecedented levels of consumer debt, 
particularly housing and, to a degree, auto debt. Several potential explanations present themselves. 
One is the influence of the tightening of underwriting standards in the wake of the financial crisis. 
The impact of tighter underwriting on the age profile of the stock of debt can operate in two 
different manners. A slowdown of lending across the board, independent of new borrower 
characteristics, will result in a gradual aging of the average outstanding loan observed in the 
population, and a resulting aging of the average borrower. Hence, in seeking the source of the 
observed graying of debt, we must investigate the extent to which mortgage and auto originations 
have slowed for borrowers of all ages. 
In addition, the creditworthiness of borrowers inferred from their credit histories and 
(ECOA-admissible) characteristics is typically lower for younger borrowers. Figure 3 depicts the 
median Equifax Risk Score by single year of age using six separate panels of risk score 
observations for six decennial cohorts. The cohorts were born, respectively, in 1940, 1950, 1960, 
1970, 1980, and 1990, and so their scores were observed at different but overlapping age ranges 




median Equifax Risk Score and age, across of all cohorts.8 The median Equifax Risk Score at age 
30 sits at or near 645 for two decennial cohorts observed 10 years apart, while the median Equifax 
Risk Score at 70 is near 770 for two cohorts. It is worth noting that this inferred creditworthiness 
profile, rather than appearing as a function of age alone, is consistent with age differences in 
repayment success, measured in terms of number and severity of delinquent accounts as well as 
bankruptcies, charge-offs, and foreclosures to be discussed below. In other words, the age profile 
of Equifax Risk Scores depicted in Figure 3 does not appear to be an artifact of credit scoring 
methods, but instead a reflection of progress in debt repayment that characterizes the life cycle of 
the typical consumer. 
Figure 3 here 
Given the evidence in Figure 3, we may expect tightening underwriting standards to affect 
credit access differently for borrowers of different ages. Younger consumers, with their lower 
median credit scores, will be excluded from credit markets at higher rates than older borrowers. 
Therefore, a tightening of underwriting standards can be expected to lead not only to a slowdown 
in overall lending and a resulting increase in the ages of borrowers with existing debt, but also a 
tilting of new originations toward older will borrowers. This, in turn, would contribute to an 
increase in the share of outstanding debt help by older borrowers relative to younger borrowers. 
To assess these two explanations for the graying of American debt, we turn to the age 
distribution of new originations early and late in the years tracked by the Consumer Credit Panel. 
Panel (a) of Figure 4 depicts the number of mortgage originations per capita by single year of age 
in the CCP in 2004 and 2017. The number of originations observed in the CCP is denominated by 
the Census projected population at each year of age for 2004 and 2017, respectively.9 




The mortgage origination age profiles in Figure 4 reveal the great extent to which a 
slowdown in mortgage originations helps explain the rightward shift of the borrower-age 
distribution of the stock of outstanding mortgage debt. Overall per capita originations declined 
from 0.12 to 0.04 over 13 years, and the origination slowdown was sharper for people of some 
ages than for others. Mortgages originated per capita among 30-year-olds fell from 0.15 in 2004 
to 0.04 in 2017. Over the same 13 years, mortgages originated per capita to 65-year-olds declined 
from 0.10 to 0.05. (Note the large difference in per capita originations to young families and to 
retirement-age buyers in 2004, and their surprising similarity by 2017). Figure 4 provides 
unambiguous evidence of a contemporary housing debt landscape shaped by a pronounced 
slowdown in new lending and a tilting of the remaining originations toward considerably older 
borrowers.10 Outstanding mortgage debt today is much older, on average, than it was 13 years ago, 
and new mortgage debt is also issued more commonly to older borrowers, relative to young 
borrowers. All of this adds up to a far greater share of outstanding mortgage debt in the hands of 
retirees, and less in the hands of young families, than we seen in the early 2000s. 
The standard term of a first lien mortgage is considerably longer than that of an auto loan. 
Hence, as we seek to understand the shift of auto debt toward older borrowers between 2003 and 
2017, we may also expect to see some evidence of changing ages in auto loan origination. Panel 
(b) of Figure 4 depicts the number of auto loan originations per capita in 2003 and 2017 by single 
year of age, calculated using the number of originations at each age in the CCP as the numerator 
and the Census projected population at each age as the denominator. The auto loan origination 
evidence is quite different from the mortgage evidence. While per capita auto originations do 
indeed slow from 2003 to 2017 for persons age 22-66, for those age 67+, the number of per capita 




originations at young and middle ages, but also a decisive tilting of new auto loan originations 
away from younger toward retirement-age consumers. For example, while per capita auto 
originations to 30-year-olds fell from 0.23 in 2003 to 0.16 in 2017, per capita auto originations to 
75-year-olds rose from 0.07 in 2003 to 0.09 in 2017. Hence we infer that the graying of auto debt 
arose more from a reallocation of new originations to older borrowers, than in the case of home-
secured debt. Moreover, we see a similar increase in auto originations from age 67+ when we look 
at per capita dollar originated. This finding is in line with results indicating that retirement-age 
borrowers increased their balances across a variety of debt types; it suggests that demand for new 
credit, in dollar terms, at older ages increased from 2003 to 2017. 
By and large, the trajectory of credit scores and originations points to a mix of mechanisms 
through which the graying of secured debt resulted. Older consumers were better positioned to 
weather the tightening of underwriting standards that followed the Great Recession. New 
originations slowed across the board, but, presumably as a result of post-recession underwriting, 
slowed more for younger than older borrowers. A slower rate of issuance of new debt led older 
outstanding debt to constitute a larger share of the stock of debt by 2017. At the same time, the 
issue of new debt favored older over younger borrowers in a way that had not been the case in the 
early 2000s. 
Delinquency and payment burden: how do retirement-age borrowers weather their greater 
financial obligations? In the absence of similar growth in income or assets at older ages, an 
increase of 94 percent in the real debt in the hands of Americans age 50+ might be alarming news, 
as well as evidence of older borrowers struggling to repay a debt burden nearly twice that of 
comparable cohorts just 14 years before. In this subsection, we look into the delinquency rates and 




delinquency and payment burdens among older borrowers in the early 2000s. Further, we review 
the evidence on the growth of the assets of older households over this period and consider older 
peoples’ ability to balance the debt growth described to this point. 
 Older borrowers are typically characterized by relatively stable households and income 
sources, at least in recent decades. It comes as little surprise, then, that older borrowers in our CCP 
and SCF data experienced less delinquency in repaying their debt than did younger borrowers. 
Panel (a) of Figure 5 depicts the percent of outstanding debt balance that transitions into a state of 
severe delinquency (more than 120 days past due over the calendar year) for 2003, 2007, and 2017 
in the CCP.11 These delinquency transitions are shown by age group, from age 18-29 through age 
70+. The share of balance transitioning into severe delinquency declines monotonically from 4.5, 
6.5, and 4.6 percent for those at age 18-29, to 1.8, 2.6, and 1.5 percent for the age 60-69 group. 
This monotonic decline was similar for each of the 2003, 2007, and 2017 calendar years. From the 
60-69 age group to 70 and beyond, we observe a flat rate of transition into severe delinquency in 
2017, but a modest uptick in the 2003 and 2007 age-delinquency profiles. This indicates that the 
relationship between transition into delinquency and age is a steeply declining one and also that it 
is stable over time. If anything, the rate of transition into delinquency at older ages improved 
modestly over time. This stable negative association between age and delinquency is one factor 
contributing to the positive association between age and Equifax Risk Score in Figure 3. 
Figures 5here 
 The news on delinquency at younger and older ages is similar in the SCF, with the 
additional information on whether consumer debt reported whether they were ever 60 or more days 
past due on any consumer debt. This measure differs from the delinquency measure from the CCP 




to be concerned that survey respondents may underreport, or otherwise erroneously report, their 
experiences of delinquency. One observation that may be encouraging on this point is the fact that 
in Brown et al. (2015) found that SCF household survey respondents self-reported bankruptcy at 
rates that appeared quite consistent with household bankruptcy rates measured in the CCP, and 
that this consistency was relatively stable from wave to wave. SCF household respondents who 
report bankruptcy experiences reliably may also report less severe delinquency more reliably. 
Second, the SCF delinquency measure is an indicator for whether any debt became 60 or more 
days delinquent, rather than a measure of the delinquent share of balance. Third, the delinquency 
standard used by the SCF is more modest, at 60 or more days past due than the 120 or more days 
past due in the CCP. Fourth, it aggregates delinquency to the household-level, as opposed to the 
individual-level of the credit report data. 
 The self-reported SCF delinquency rate among households with positive consumer debt 
behaves quite similarly to the rate of transition into severe delinquency from the CCP. Panel (b) 
of Figure 5 reports the delinquent share of borrower households by age of household head for 
1989, 2001, 2004, 2007, and 2016. The stability of the negative association between delinquency 
and age is striking. Delinquency rates declined steadily for the below age 35 to the age 75+ group 
in each of the SCF waves. Households below age 34 had delinquency rates of 9, 11, 11, 12, and 
14 percent in the five waves. Households age 75+ had delinquency rates of 1, 1, 1, 3, and 4 percent 
in the five waves. Though the delinquency rates of 65- to 74-year-olds in 2016 were near the top 
of the five-survey range, at 4.5 percent, and those 75+ were higher in 2016 than in 1989, 2001, and 
2007 (though not in 2004), at 2.8 percent, the delinquency rates of older SCF households in 2016 
remain low in an absolute sense and similar to the delinquency rates of the older SCF households 




were repaying debts that were nearly five times the size of the debts owed by their predecessors in 
the same age group in 1989. In sum, although evidence of Americans all carrying higher levels of 
debt into retirement, we see little evidence of rising delinquency among older borrowers over many 
waves of data drawn from leading administrative and survey-based consumer data sources. 
Our results might be seen as contradicting with those of Li and White (2020) who also use 
the CCP. Yet the studies track different measures of repayment success, or financial struggle. Li 
and White’s outcome measure is the share of overall consumer bankruptcies (foreclosures) that 
involve older borrowers. They examine formal default and focus on the share of outstanding debt 
affected by formal default. By contrast, our CCP delinquency rates measure the share of 
outstanding debt that is troubled, and we do so separately for each age group, given changing 
population shares. Further, our measure encompasses both formal and informal default, as we track 
the share of debt transitioning to 120 or more days past due over the calendar year.12 Hence the 
CCP data may be characterized by both modest declines in the share of outstanding debt held by 
older borrowers that transitions into severe delinquency, and modest increases in the share of 
bankruptcies (foreclosures) attributable to older borrowers. 
Our SCF delinquency by age figure points to one other factor that may contribute to the 
apparent contrast between our findings and those of Li and White. In Figure 5, we see older 
households in 2016 self-reporting a rate of delinquency that is slightly high in comparison with 
prior rates (though not the highest across the SCF waves), and younger households self-reporting 
a rate of delinquency that is slightly low in comparison with prior rates (though not the lowest 
across the SCF waves). Elsewhere our CCP results have shown improving repayment performance 
for younger borrowers in recent years, as, for example, in Figure 3.  Li and White are interested in 




one contributor to the rising relative formal default rates they report is the improving repayment 
performance of younger consumers. 
Finally, there is some consistency across these two studies in terms of the qualitative results 
regarding financial distress by age over the years we study. Li and White estimate a modest or null 
influence of the 2005 bankruptcy reform and of the 2008 financial crisis, on the relative formal 
default rates of young and old consumers from 2000 to 2012. This seems in line with our own 
observation of stability in the age dependence of delinquency over these years. Li and White, 
however, find an increase in older borrowers’ relative rates of formal default since 2012, when 
compared with those of younger borrowers. Our heterogeneity analysis below, with its evidence 
of emerging financial struggle among low-balance, low-asset households in the SCF provides 
some complementary evidence regarding these recent developments. 
 The SCF is further useful for our purposes as, unlike credit report data, it allows us to weigh 
changes in the debt side of the consumer balance sheet against changes in the asset side of the 
consumer balance sheet. Figure 6 describes at once the growth in household debt and household 
net worth from 1989 through 2016 in the SCF. In Panel (a), we observe a similar rightward shift 
in the age distribution of debt in the SCF to the rightward shift observed in the age distribution of 
debt from the CCP. Panel (b), however, indicates that this debt growth at older ages is dwarfed by 
the growth of assets at older ages. In 1989, the peak of the age profile of net worth in the SCF 
occurs at ages 55-64. Further, the mean household net worth level at age 55-64 in 1989 was not 
substantially higher than the mean net worth level in 1989 for age 45-54. By 2001, however, the 
net worth peak for age 55-64 is pronounced, and grew in real terms by 73 percent, from $574,000 
to $993,000. At last, in 2016, we observe a far steeper climb of mean household net worth from 




rose again, to $1,168,000. Most notably, where net worth fell off sharply at later ages in the 2001 
SCF wave, mean net worth values in the 2016 SCF remained approximately flat for the 55-64 age 
group and into the older age groups, at $1,066,000 and $1,067,000 for the 65-74 and 75+ age 
groups, respectively. 
Figures 6 here 
As debt at older ages climbed to unprecedented heights between the early 2000s and recent 
years, it was therefore balanced by similarly unprecedented, and substantially larger, growth in 
assets at older ages. Like the evidence regarding the evolution over time of payment to income 
ratios, the evolving age profile of assets among US households helps to explain older households’ 
ability to sustain and repay unprecedented levels of household debt. This debt is rendered less 
consequential by the newfound affluence of today’s American elders. 
Heterogeneity in debt changes by socioeconomic status. To this point, our analysis of debt 
accumulation, growth, and repayment has focused on broad age groups. In the aggregate, debt 
growth was mostly attributable to housing debt secured by the primary residence and housing debt 
secured by other residential properties. In the aggregate, older households bore only modest debt 
payment burdens, and they were more successful in avoiding delinquency than their younger 
contemporaries. But there is heterogeneity in older households’ financial situations, which we 
examine by comparing delinquency rates of residents of high- and low-income neighborhoods in 
the CCP, and between high and low asset households in the SCF. 
The SCF allows us to identify differences in borrowing and delinquency at older ages 
across deciles of the household asset distribution. Figure 7 depicts the 2001 and 2016 mean total 
household debt in the SCF by household asset decile: it reflects the debt of only households with 




the mean level of debt in 2016 US dollars held by members of each asset decile. Panel (b) 
represents the ratio of the mean household debt to the mean household asset level within each asset 
decile.13 
Figures 7 here 
This depiction of overall debt enables us to pinpoint the subgroups responsible for the 
lion’s share of the rise in the aggregate dollars of debt held by older borrowers, and to identify 
which groups are increasingly laboring under the burden of consumer debt, as their debt to asset 
ratios rise to levels suggesting financial instability.14 We find that the large increase in per capita 
debt dollars at older ages over the 2001 to 2016 period was concentrated primarily from increased 
borrowing among members of the wealthiest (9th and 10th) deciles of the household asset 
distribution. Moreover, their increase in overall dollars of debt arose predominantly from increased 
debt balances secured by primary residences, and in debt secured by other residential property.15 
Put differently, the bulk of the growth in debt held by older Americans from 2001 to 2016 is 
attributable to increased reliance on housing debt secured by higher-valued primary and other 
residential property among the most affluent members of the household asset distribution.16 This 
evidence does not support the views of growing financial hardship among all older Americans, but 
instead indicates growing financial advantage on the part of older Americans, accompanied by 
outsized recourse to consumer credit markets. Younger borrowers, in contrast, are less favored by 
stringent underwriting standards. 
We do, however, see a group of older households who may be struggling with increasing 
debt burden and the types of debts most closely involved: namely, households in the 3rd through 
7th deciles of the household asset distribution, who experienced rising debt obligations attached to 




mortgages held by older consumers in our CCP data. Bucks and Pence (2008) showed that SCF 
respondents did report reliably on other details of their home mortgages, but they were 
comparatively unreliable in reporting whether they held fixed or adjustable rate mortgages. 
However, following Lusardi et al. (2018), we note that the large increases observed in the home-
secured debt carried by middle-asset households into retirement do constitute a new source of 
financial risk in retirement. Further, per Lusardi et al., such households’ financial risk is 
exacerbated to the extent that their debt contracts are vulnerable to interest rate changes. 
The lowest decile of the asset distribution, despite its modest mean debt in dollar amount 
terms, displays the largest jump in the ratio of debt to assets between 2001 and 2016. Panel (b) of 
Figure 7 shows a jump in the ratio of total debt to assets for this group from 0.33 to 1.0. As is clear, 
the bottom asset decile carries the highest ratio of total debt to assets, by far, among the deciles of 
the asset distribution. Moreover, the burden of its debt at older ages relative to limited assets grew 
substantially from 2001 to 2016. The analysis of the lowest asset group’s debt changes by type of 
debt presented in the online appendix reveals one noteworthy change: the dollar amount of the rise 
in student debt among this group is equivalent to 55 percent of its total household assets. 
Our findings for lower asset households support the insights of Lusardi et al. (2020) 
regarding the emerging dependence on high cost debt of older socioeconomically disadvantaged 
consumers period. Results presented in our online appendix demonstrate the great extent to which 
the observed increase in the ratio of debt to assets among the lowest asset decile in the SCF is a 
product of reliance on unsecured debt (including both card and student debt). Lusardi et al. 
demonstrates a rising reliance on high-cost debt, in terms of interest and fees, among 




financial literacy, information, and behavioral biases to such high-cost borrowing among older 
consumers. 
In sum, the large dollar amount increase in debt among older households appears to stem 
from affluent older households’ increasing reliance on primary and other residential debt, balanced 
by a striking run-up in assets. Yet the rising household-level ratio of debt to assets among older 
Americans was driven in large part by an increase in debt, paired with a modest decrease in assets, 
particularly among households in the lowest decile of the asset distribution. Such growth in debt 
burdens as a share of assets for the most financially vulnerable older households has been mainly 
due to their participation in the massive growth of educational borrowing in the US between 2001 
and 2016. 
Heterogeneity in delinquency trends by socioeconomic status. Another dimension to our results 
has to do with delinquency rates among older borrowers in the CCP and SCF, where we see few 
signs of new trouble for most older households. Figure 8 depicts the share of each household asset 
decile that self-reported being 60 or more days past due in any debt repayment, for both 2001 and 
2016. With the exception of the fourth decile, delinquency rates were quite similar across deciles 
in 2001 to 2016. Only the 4th decile showed a notable increase, and its delinquency rate topped out 
at 9 percent. Moreover, despite the debt to asset ratio spike, we see no suggestion that repayment 
has deteriorated meaningfully for SCF households in the first decile of the asset distribution. 
Figures 8 here 
 In the face of rising housing debt and, for the lowest-asset households, a large uptick in the 
ratio of debt to assets, the encouraging low levels of delinquency among older SCF households 
suggests that they are weathering repayment of these large obligations near and in retirement 




Evidence thus far indicates that older borrowers repay reliably even as debt obligations rise, as 
debt to asset ratios rise, and as they age into a stage of the life-cycle at which consumers’ access 
to credit has traditionally been of limited importance. Accordingly, some failure to default may 
amount to a suboptimal choice. Future work will focus more closely on delinquency and default 
decisions as people age into retirement. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has documented the rise of consumer borrowing among older Americans 
between the early 2000s and 2016-2017. We observed an 81 percent increase in the dollar amount 
of debt held by Americans between age 55-80 from 2003 to 2017 using administrative lender-side 
data; the increase in mean self-reported household consumer debt among households with heads 
age 55+ in borrower-side survey data from 2001 to 2016 rose by $31,262, or 69 percent. There 
were also changes in the composition of older consumers’ debt over the period, demonstrating 
mounting levels of card, education, auto, and housing debt among older Americans. The growth 
in secured debts was most rapid, however, with auto debt among Americans age 55+ growing by 
69 percent from 2003 to 2017, and housing debt by 89 percent. Further, we find that the housing 
debt growth was driven by borrowing by the top half of the asset distribution, with debt secured 
by other properties rising particularly for the top two deciles of the household asset distribution.17  
 These results suggest that much of the rise in debt among seniors need not be interpreted 
as causing financial struggles in retirement. Connecting this change in borrowing to the change in 
assets held by older households over this same period, we observe that most older households’ 
debt was well balanced by their assets. The age distribution of household assets has, like the age 




assets has been far greater than the growth in debt for older American households. Accordingly, 
the mass of net worth held by the US older population has now reached unprecedented levels. This 
fact helps explain the resilience of older borrowers’ repayment reliability in the face of growing 
obligations. Our analysis of delinquency among older borrowers indicates little or no increase in 
delinquency among older borrowers over the period. This is true in general, for seniors living in 
both high- and low-income zip codes (in the CCP), and across the household asset distribution (in 
the SCF). If the rise in senior debt were leading to financial struggles in retirement, evidence of 
this struggle has not yet emerged in the form of delinquency and default. Older consumers continue 
to repay very reliably. 
 Nevertheless, the population is heterogeneous. For the lower half of the household asset 
distribution, the ratio of total debt to assets has risen by more than 10 percentage points from 2001 
to 2016, and the rise is particularly pronounced for the lowest decile of the asset distribution, from 
0.33 to 1.02. Much of this increase is accounted for by the entry into the student debt market of 
the first decile of the senior household asset distribution between 2001 and 2016. Hence, while our 
results suggest that the overall increase in debt in retirement need not portend broad financial 
trouble for seniors, particular categories of loans are of concern.  
Our evidence leaves many topics open for further study. As one example, we observe 
increasing secured debt in the hands of older consumers, while young students and families appear 
to have backed away from credit markets. This raises the question of differential access to credit 
early and late in the life cycle, and of the changing nature of consumer debt in the 21st century. 
Another example is the risen vulnerability to housing market downturns. In particular, retirement-
age Americans now hold unprecedented levels of housing debt, which could leave them more 




whether younger cohorts holding substantial student debt, and who have been slow to enter into 
homeownership, will be able to save adequately for retirement.  
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1 CCP data offer a unique opportunity to track multiple (first and second home, mortgage and home 
equity) residential loans at the level of the individual or even the household. However, the closing 
of repaid mortgages on primary residences as borrowers age poses a (not insurmountable) 
challenge for tracking the sources of residential debt among older consumers in the CCP. Loans 
for vacation properties, for example, may begin to look like loans for primary residences. 
2 For ease of comparison, all financial variables in the paper are reported in 2016 US dollars. 
3 Online Appendix forthcoming. 
4 Note that we have widened the range of ages included in our treatment of older households here, 
as the SCF sample is considerably smaller than the CCP, and we sought to establish patterns based 
on a larger proportion of sample households. 
5 Note also that balances in other residential debt are quite small for younger households in the 
SCF. 
6 The average total balance at the household level for each wave is greater than the average total 
balance we find for individuals in the CCP, which is to be expected given the large proportion of 
US households containing either two or three adults. 
7 The Equifax Risk Score uses credit report components to establish a score value that can be used 
to predict the relative probability that a consumer will default on newly issued debt in 24 months. 
In this sense, it is analogous to the FICO score. 
8 The risk score profile of the most recent cohort, the 1990 birth cohort, lies above that of the 1980 
birth cohort for each of their ages of overlap. Potential explanations for this phenomenon vary, 
including the passage of first the bankruptcy reform (BAPCPA) in 2005 and then the CARD act 
in 2009, each of which specifically influences the credit access or repayment options of either 




                                                                                                                                                             
young borrowers or student borrowers. In addition, this cohort holds more student debt during the 
earlier ages being compared, which typically raises inferred creditworthiness in the years before 
repayment struggles emerge. Finally, we have long observed markedly more successful repayment 
at early ages among this cohort than among earlier cohorts. 
9 The reader may note that we have moved from our previous study of the 2003 wave of the CCP 
to the 2004 data. Because 2003 was a boom year for mortgage refinancing, as a result of falling 
mortgage interest rates, the level of mortgage originations was artificially elevated in 2003. As we 
examine the extent to which mortgage originations dropped overall from the early 2000s to the 
more recent CCP waves, the refi boom might lead to us to conclude, spuriously, that the aging of 
mortgage holders over the period arose from a stark slowdown in across-the-board mortgage 
lending. In order to avoid such false inferences, we look instead at mortgage originations in 2004, 
when much of the refinancing spike had passed. Our qualitative findings, however, change little 
when we use 2003 mortgage originations. 
10 We observe the same pattern when plotting per capita mortgage origination dollars by age. 
11 Transition into severe delinquency is calculated as the share of outstanding debt that transitions 
into a state of severe delinquency, measured as a status of 120 days or more past due, over the 
course of the calendar year, divided by total outstanding debt. 
12 As noted by Drozd and Serrano-Padial (2013), the majority of default on unsecured credit in the 
US is informal. 
13 Note that this measure differs from an average taken across the individual debt to asset ratios of 
the sample households. Patterns reported in the lower panel of each of figures 13, 14, and 15 are 




                                                                                                                                                             
first decile, in which 22 (5) percent of households in the first asset decile in 2001 (2016) hold zero 
assets. 
14 Two figures provided in the online appendix are constructed similarly, but reflect the growth in 
debt within each asset decile broken into the standard consumer debt categories. These figures 
allow us to locate the debt categories most closely associated with the growth in debt dollars among 
older consumers, and the categories most closely associated with burdensome debt to asset ratios. 
15 Detailed findings on housing debt across the SCF asset distribution appear in the online 
appendix. 
16 Home equity reached record highs in recent years. See, for example, Haughwout et al. (2018). 
17 These findings are consistent with recent evidence that home equity in the US has reached all-




Figure 1a. Composition of per capita consumer debt at ages 18 to 34, CCP 
 
Source: Authors’ Calculations  
 
  
Figure 1b. Composition of per capita consumer debt at ages 65 and above, CCP 
 





































Figure 2a. Composition of per household consumer debt at ages 18 to 34, SCF 
Source: Authors’ Calculations    
  
Figure 2b. Composition of per household consumer debt at ages 55 and above, SCF  
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Figure 3. Median Equifax Risk Score by single year of age for five decennial birth cohorts, 1999-2018 
CCP   



























Figure 4a. Mortgage originations per capita by single year of age, 2004 v. 2017, CCP   
 


















Figure 4b. Auto loan originations per capita by single year of age, 2003 v. 2017, CCP    
 














Figure 5a: Age profile of transition into severe delinquency, CCP 2003, 2007, & 2017 
 

























Figure 5b. Age profile of the share of households 60+ days past due on any consumer debt, SCF  
 




























Figure 6a. Mean household debt by age of household head, SCF 1989, 2001, & 2016 
 


































Figure 6b. Mean net worth by age of household head, SCF 1989, 2001, & 2016 
 






























Figure 7a. Mean total debt within asset deciles, ages 55+, SCF 2001 v. 2016 
 




















Figure 7b. Ratio of mean total debt to mean assets within asset deciles, ages 55+, SCF 2001 v. 2016 
 















Figure 8. Share of households 60+ days past due on any consumer debt, household head 55 and over, 
SCF 2001 v. 2016 
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